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 DEATH (MACHINES) AND TAXES 
 
Abstract:  In the defense policy literature, it is widely believed that there is a pronounced bias 
towards the procurement of a less than optimal number of excessively sophisticated weapons.  In 
this paper, we consider the possibility that this perceived bias is the result of the timing and 
informational structure of defense procurement decisions, and the inter-relationship of this structure 
with overall fiscal policy.  Specifically, this paper presents a model that suggests that tax smoothing 
considerations of the type first articulated in Barro (1979) could lead social welfare maximizing 
decision makers to choose a higher level of weapon quality than would be optimal if government 
revenue could be raised without resort to distortionary taxation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is widely believed that the defense procurement processes followed by most countries result in the 
purchase of an inefficiently small number of excessively sophisticated weapons.  This belief can be 
traced back to the ACEVAL/AIMVAL trials conducted by the US Air Force during the 1970s.  In 
these trials, advanced F-15 fighters were pitted against "low tech" F-5 interceptors in simulated air 
combat engagements.  The F-15s performed no better than the F-5s.
1   
 
Since ACEVAL/AIMVAL first raised the subject, a number of empirical studies have reported 
anecdotal or "case study" evidence in support of a systematic bias towards procurement of high 
quality weapons.  Most notable amongst these studies are Gansler (1980), Stubbing (1986), and 
Lipow and Feinerman (2001).   
 
While psychologists may chalk up this bias towards fancy weapons to a bad case of "missile envy," 
no less than three papers have considered the economic theory underpinning the "quantity/quality" 
trade-offs inherent in the defense procurement process.  In Rogerson (1990), the military leadership 
is motivated by an idealistic commitment to maximizing the nation’s combat capabilities.  The 
government, however, is interested in maximizing a social welfare function of which military 
capability is only one argument, while program cost is another.   
 
Rogerson assumes that the military controls the weapon development process, thus allowing it to 
dictate the level of quality incorporated into proposed weapon systems.  The government, having 
                                                  
1A number of observers, including the authors of this paper, regard the AICVAl/AIMVAL results with great skepticism.  
All engagements were in daylight and good weather, negating the F-15's superior night/adverse weather capabilities. 
Ground radars guided the aircraft to each other, negating the value of the F-15s superior radar.  Furthermore, all 
engagements were near USAF bases, eliminating the F-15s advantage in range.  In short, the F-15 was unable to 
demonstrate its qualitative superiority because the structure of the trials forbade it from doing so. 
 
  3been presented with a system whose quality cannot be altered, then determines the quantity it desires 
to purchase.  When quality and quantity are poor (good) substitutes in the production of military 
capability, this framework gives the military an incentive to choose systems of higher (lower) than 
socially optimal quality.   
 
Lipow and Feinerman (2001) consider a special case that mimics the institutional arrangements 
established in Israel.  In their formulation, the military faces a fixed budget constraint but enjoys 
absolute control of budget allocation.  The quality of military leadership is not directly observable.  
In order to enhance their reputations, officers engage in signaling behavior that results in a 
separating equilibrium in which more capable military leaders choose to purchase weapons of 
excessive quality while less capable leaders choose a socially optimal quality level. 
  
In Feinerman and Lipow (2001), the authors argue that the choice of weapon quality must be made 
under conditions of uncertainty regarding the security environment that the military will face when 
the proposed weapon is actually fielded, while the choice of quantity is only taken following 
observation of the evolution of security threats.  They find that for most credible classes of 
production functions, the inter-temporal and informational structure of the decision making process 
unambiguously leads to the choice of a higher level of weapon quality than would be the case under 
conditions of certainty or if the quality and quantity decisions were made simultaneously.  
 
In this paper, we will argue that the efficiency of the tax system may also influence the socially 
optimal choice of weapons quality.   In our formulation, social welfare is a function of military 
capability and the total social cost of financing the program, where total social cost includes both 
direct program costs as well as the welfare losses stemming from the taxation required to finance 
  4program costs.  This differs from papers such as Rogerson (1990) and Feinerman and Lipow (2001) 
that only consider direct program costs. 
 
Our approach to tax efficiency is strongly inspired by Barro (1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1982).  
Barro models the dead-weight loss of taxation as an increasing function of the tax rate.  This allows 
him to derive an inter-temporal version of the Ramsey Rule (Ramsey, 1927) known as "tax 
smoothing" in which tax efficiency is maximized by maintaining a constant marginal tax level over 
time.  
 
Lucas and Stokey (1982) extend Barro's approach into a stochastic world and demonstrate that tax 
smoothing holds not only over time but over states of nature.  This implies that marginal tax rates 
should evolve as a random walk process driven by unexpected changes in spending and tax revenue. 
 
The intuition behind our argument is quite straightforward.  Wars result in an unexpected increase in 
government expenditures as well as an unexpected decline in tax revenue.  An investment in weapon 
quality yields a high return when there is a war and a low return when there is peace.  In other 
words, it yields a high pay-off precisely in the state of nature that would otherwise require that 
marginal tax rates be raised.  Due to the increasing marginal cost associated with tax rates, a 
government concerned with lowering total expected social cost would invest more in weapon quality 
than would be the case if its objective is to minimize expected program cost. 
 
This paper has four sections.  In the second section, we present a model of defense procurement 
decision making.  The model demonstrates that tax efficiency consideration do indeed influence the 
socially optimal level of weapons quality.  An unambiguous bias towards greater weapon quality, 
however, requires additional assumptions regarding the production of military capability or the level 
  5of security threat.  In the third section, we argue that, in practice, the conditions required for tax 
smoothing to lead to a bias towards greater weapon quality are almost always met.  The fourth 
section concludes the paper. 
 
THE MODEL 
In this model, the government must procure a new weapon system.  Following Feinerman and 
Lipow (2001), defense procurement is modeled as a two-period process.  The quality level must be 
chosen during the first period.  When the government chooses the quality level, it does not know 
what the national security situation will look like when the weapon actually enters production.  It 
does, however, have certain beliefs regarding the likelihood of various different security scenarios.     
 
Between the first and second period, decision makers observe the evolution of the security threat.  
This reflects the protracted lag between the decision to design and test a weapon and the decision to 
actually go ahead and deploy it.  For example, America's recently deployed F-22 "Raptor" fighter 
aircraft required 22 years of development.  By the time the Raptor was ready for production, the 
security threat for which it was originally designed – a full scale conventional war with the Soviet 
Union – had literally disappeared. 
 
During the second period, the government chooses the quantity of weapons to be purchased.  
Clearly, if national security threats have subsided over the course of a weapon's development phase, 
the production run will be scaled back or even canceled.  If, on the other hand, security conditions 
have eroded during the weapon development phase, production may exceed that foreseen when the 
weapon was first proposed. 
 
  6To simplify the analysis and preserve its underlying intuition, we assume that the government’s 
budget must always be balanced.   In a related working paper, we show that when the government 
may record fiscal surpluses and deficits, there is no closed form analytical solution to the 
government’s optimization problem.  In terms of optimal weapon quality, the results of simulation 
analyses prove to be consistent with the results presented in this paper.  What is lost by assuming 
budget balance is the capability to evaluate the role of precautionary surpluses and deficits as tools 
in minimizing the social cost of evolving security threats. 
 
Let Q be the amount of "weapon quality" and let N represent the number of weapons procured as 
well as the manpower required to operate them.  The units of Q and N are calibrated so that the cost 
of a unit in both cases is 1.  In other words, Q measures the expenditure on weapon research and 
development (as well as long lead-time fixed costs associated with readying the weapon for 
production) while N represents the expenditure on variable costs associated with procurement and 
manning. 
 
Let the function D(Q,N) represent the level of military capability produced by a particular 






n, where q,n>0. 
 
In addition to simplifying the presentation and analysis, the choice of Cobb-Douglass technology 
accurately reflects the methods applied by government policy makers.  As evidence, consider the 
routine exploitation of Cobb-Douglass production functions in the CGE simulations so widely used 
to analyze tax reforms and trade agreements.      
  7 
There are two possible states of nature during the second period.  The first is "war," and the second 
is "peace."  The term war implies full scale conflict, or what is commonly known amongst military 
planners as the "worst case scenario."  Thus, the probability that a new armored vehicle, for 
example, may engage in combat during a peace keeping mission may be very high, but has no 
impact on decision making.   
 
The government correctly believes during the first period that the probability of war during the 
second period is p.  In the event of peace, the level of military capability required is zero, while in 
the event of war the level required is D0.  This implies that N equals zero in the event of peace.  In 
the event of war, 
 
 (2) Q B Q D N n
q
n / γ − − ≡ =
1
0 , where B≡D0
1/n and  γ≡(q/n). 
 
Given the probability of war, what is the socially optimal level of weapon quality?  Let β<1 be the 








If τ=0 then the taxes raised to finance R&D and procurement are non-distorting, in the sense that 
there is no excess burden associated with the tax system. The cost of a dollar of taxes is one dollar. 




For Q to be optimal it must satisfy 
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Before proceeding, note that 
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This makes perfect sense: as the probability of war increases, and hence the chance that money will 
be spent on procurement and manpower, more of the burden is shifted to R&D. This, irrespective of 
whether or not the tax is distortionary. 
 
How does increased distortion affect the allocation between Q and N? For an answer, differentiate Q 
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A necessary condition for (4) to be positive is 
 
  lnβ+lnp+lnγ=lnβ+lnp+lnq-ln(n)<0. 
 
Or, more elegantly, 
 




< β  
 
The left hand side of (5) is always less than 1, since β is the time discount rate and p is a probability.  
Hence, for (5) to hold it is sufficient – but not necessary – that n≥q: the production elasticity of N 
must at least equal the production elasticity of Q. 
 
DISCUSSION 
There are a number of theoretical and empirical reasons to suspect that the production elasticity of N 
will generally be greater than that of Q.  One alternative is to consider the defense production 
function introduced in Lanchester (1916).
2   
 
Strictly speaking, one cannot compare Lanchester’s elasticities with those of Eq. (1).  The 
formulation exploited in this paper is not calibrated in the same type of units as Lanchester’s, and as 
Hildebrandt (1999) points out, formulations like those used in this paper are best defined as 
“military utility functions” while Lanchester equations are a form of genuine “military production 
function” that measures objective measures of output such as the number of targets destroyed rather 
than the amount of “national security.”  
 
In spite of this, we feel that Lanchester’s approach does indeed lend some support for the idea that n 
will exceed q.  The reason is simple.  Lanchester’s analysis demonstrates that raw numbers matter a 
lot in determining victory on the battlefield, and there must be some connection between battlefield 
outcomes and a nation’s military utility function.  
                                                  
2 The Lanchester defense production function is still widely used in the formal modeling of warfare.  Amongst the 
recent applications of Lanchester’s approach are Shustik (1983), Dupuy (1985), Danilek et. al. (2001), and Gordon 
(2003). 
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In Lanchester’s formulation of the defense production function, two armies – red and blue, 
designated R and B - face each other in battle.  The force that destroys the other before it itself is 






where Q represents the probability that each weapon on the battlefield will hit and destroy an enemy 
weapon and N represents the number of weapons on the battlefield.  Had Lanchester coached his 
model in the production-function mold, (6) would have meant that the production elasticity of 
quantity is twice that of quality.  For the type of attritional combat envisaged by Lanchester this 
result is supported by considerable intuition.  An increase in weapon accuracy increases the rate at 
which the enemy is destroyed.  An increase in numbers, however, increases both the rate at which 
the enemy is destroyed and the number of targets that the enemy must itself destroy in order to win. 
 
It is easy to show that Lanchester’s result is a very special case of the much more general “military 
utility” function we assume in (1).  What is required is to modify (1) by assuming that (i) quality is 
measured by weapon accuracy and lethality; (ii) the cost of producing Q and N exhibits constant 
returns to scale; (iii) all weapons are always within range of each other; (iv) hit/kill probabilities are 
unaffected by the number or quality of weapons fielded by the enemy, (v) victory in battle is 
determined through attritional “last man standing” processes; and that (vi) victory in battle is the 
only determinant of “military utility.” 
 
While some of these assumptions are harmless, others are quite problematic. The assumption that 
the production of Q and N exhibit constant returns seems benign.  Given that it is not possible to 
  11raise weapon accuracy and lethality above a level of one (at which point each shot is certain to 
destroy an enemy unit), it is almost certain that the marginal cost of enhanced accuracy and lethality 
is an increasing function.  As for quantity, it is quite likely that the marginal cost of producing more 
aircraft or tanks is a decreasing function.
3  Taken together, these relationships would further 
reinforce the higher elasticity of production for quantity relative to quality when measured in 
monetary terms.     
 
A more serious problem stems from differences in the definition of weapon quality.  This paper uses 
a wider and more general definition of weapon quality than that used by Lanchester (1916).  For 
example, long lead time expenditures that result in an increase in a weapon’s mechanical reliability, 
rate of fire, survivability, or range would be included as expenditures on weapon quality in our 
formulation since they are expenditures that must be made during the weapon’s design phase.  In 
terms of Lanchester’s approach, however, such expenditures would influence not the accuracy and 
lethality of weapons but their number. 
 
A third serious problem is that Lanchester assumes that the probability of hitting and destroying an 
enemy weapon is independent of the number of weapons that the enemy fields.  This is not likely to 
be the case.  Often, fire directed on one target hits another nearby target.  This is particularly true in 
light infantry engagements.  As a force grows larger, the probability that enemy fire will hit 
something goes up.
4    When this is the case, Lanchester’s equation will over-estimate the value of 
fielding more weapons, since higher quantity will have the unintended and undesirable effect of 
increasing the effectiveness of the opponent’s forces as measured by its probability of hitting and 
destroying your forces. 
                                                  
3 For example, see Arrow (1962). 
4 Indeed, the probability that friendly fire will hit one’s own forces goes up as well. 
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Finally, it is legitimate to question the validity of Lanchester’s attritional perspective on warfare.  
While attrition certainly played an important role in strategic thinking during World War I, the fact 
is that few wars are won by completely destroying the enemy.  Most battles are won by inducing the 
enemy to run away.  It is not clear that Lanchester’s equations are still relevant if superior morale – 
rather than greater numbers – is the key to victory. 
 
In spite of all these caveats, we still feel that Lanchester’s approach does indeed offer some support 
for the idea that the production elasticity of N will generally exceed the production elasticity of Q, 
and that as a result, tax smoothing considerations will lead to higher long lead- time military 
expenditures.   
 
Defense budget data offers another reason to suspect that the production elasticity of N usually 
exceeds that of Q.  If this was not the case, a relatively large share of defense spending would be 
devoted to weapons research and development, while only a small share would be allocated to 
procurement, training, and manpower.  Yet published data on defense spending (to the extent that it 
can be regarded as reliable
5) suggests that  R&D costs typically account for 10% or less of total 
military spending, while manpower, training, and operations costs generally exceed 70% of total 
spending.   
 
To be sure, both Lanchester's equations and defense budget data are simply insufficient to rule out 
situations in which the production elasticity of Q exceeds that of N.  We believe, however, that the 
                                                  
5 Not only are statistics on defense spending notoriously unreliable, but the budget categories identified as being for 
research, procurement, training, and manpower do not always correspond to the usage applied in the paper.  For 
example, the salary of a research project's "program manager" may be counted as a manpower cost, although in reality 
this expense represents an investment in weapon quality.  Meanwhile, research expenditures could include investments 
in R&D infrastructure or could even be masking the funding of intelligence agencies and special operations units. 
  13inequality in (5) will still hold under most circumstances.  Say, for example, that the production 
elasticity of quality is twice that of quantity – something that seems unlikely.  Assuming a 4% 
annual discount rate, a reasonable value for β would be 0.7, reflecting the 10 years required to 
design a modern weapon.  This means that (5) would hold if there was a probability of a full scale 
war below 70% for the period between 10 and 30 years in the future.   
 
Now, the perception that there is a 70% probability of full scale war between 10 and 30 years in the 
future is a staggering level of security threat.  Most countries that are currently in a legal state of war 
– countries such as Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan – do not foresee the likelihood of full scale 
combat during the next 30 years as being anywhere near that high.  As for the Europeans and the 
Japanese, they regard real war as a distant and bad memory.  Hence, it is extremely likely that tax 
system inefficiencies result in higher levels of weapon quality even when the elasticity of production 
for Q vastly exceeds that of N. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A credible case can be made that the inefficiencies inherent in taxation lead to the procurement of 
more sophisticated weapons than would otherwise be the case.  This has several implications for 
researchers and policy makers.  First, our results cast additional doubt on published evidence of a 
systematic bias towards excessive weapon quality.  None of the empirical studies cited above took 
tax efficiency considerations into account.  Failure to consider the role of tax efficiency in the 
procurement process biases the results of these studies towards what we believe to be incorrect 
conclusions.  
 
Second, our results undermine the logic behind "sustainable" development theories that claim that 
LDCs are biased towards the adoption of "inappropriate" capital intensive technologies.  Many poor 
  14countries do indeed field weapons as or even more sophisticated than those in service with OECD 
militaries.  Hence, it is tempting to conclude that LDC military procurement decisions are evidence 
in support of sustainable development's "inappropriate technology" hypothesis.   
 
Why do our results challenge the sustainable development paradigm?  Without doubt, countries with 
low capital/labor ratios would prefer to purchase larger numbers of simpler weapons.  On the other 
hand, our results suggest that countries with relatively primitive and inefficient tax systems would 
prefer to develop more sophisticated weapons.
 6  Since most LDCs have inefficient tax systems, it is 
entirely conceivable that they gain more from the tax smoothing benefits of higher weapon quality 
than they lose due to the costs associated with spending their relatively scarce capital.  In other 
words, "high tech" may be the appropriate technology for the defense needs of developing countries.   
 
Finally, this paper is to the best of our knowledge the first example in the literature of a situation in 
which tax smoothing considerations influence and alter public investment decisions.
7  Our 
formulation suggests that when tax smoothing is taken into account, conversion to a more efficient 
tax system should lead to reduced defense expenditures.  Hence, more efficient taxation not only 
reduces the welfare cost of raising a given level of revenue.  It may lower the required level of 
revenue as well.  Failure to take this effect into account could lead to a significant under-estimate of 
the aggregate welfare gains produced by a well designed tax reform.   
 
                                                  
6 It may be argued that our results do not hold for LDCs since few of these countries design or manufacture their own 
weapons.  This is not the case.  Many LDCs actually do produce much of their own weaponry, including Brazil, China, 
Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.  
7 Following publication of Bohn (1990), a vibrant literature has developed regarding the use of government debt 
management as a tool in facilitating tax smoothing.   
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